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1 Introduction
A vast literature provides widespread evidence that geographical borders reduce trade. This
evidence applies across a broad range of markets at both country- and state-level despite
suitable controls for region size, distance and other relevant factors. Further empirical find-
ings show that traditional explanations for this phenomenon, such as the effects of tariffs and
transportation costs, are unable to fully explain its prevalence. Instead, the findings point
to some less conventional trade barriers, including the existence of information frictions or
localized tastes (see Grossman 1998, and the surveys by Anderson and van Wincoop 2004
and Head and Mayer 2013). However, an explicit theoretical comparison of these rival ex-
planations remains absent from the literature. Addressing this omission is important to help
further understand trade barriers and to guide policymakers towards the most appropriate
tools for promoting trade and globalization.
As a first step towards such an aim, this paper presents a succinct model that can compare
some theoretical mechanisms for three broad forms of trade barriers, and assess their relative
power in determining cross-border trade, and associated levels of welfare. In particular, it
compares i) ‘trade costs’ including cross-border tariffs, transportation costs, and transaction
costs, ii) ‘localized tastes’ where buyers exhibit a (perceived) dis-utility of trading with sell-
ers from outside their home region, and iii) ‘information frictions’ where buyers incur costs
of gathering and interpreting information about sellers from regions other than their own.
Despite being traditionally under-researched, our model provides the stark finding that infor-
mation frictions often provide the relatively larger marginal effect on reducing cross-border
trade, and associated welfare.
Among other implications, this suggests that even small information frictions may pro-
vide a strong barrier to trade. Moreover, aside from traditional trade policies that aim to
reduce tariffs or transportation costs, our results point to the potential merit of less-standard
trade policies that aim to reduce information frictions. Such information based policies im-
prove the transparency and accessibility of market information, by for example, improving
broadband connections, encouraging online cross-border information sources, or promoting
common format/multi-lingual product labeling.
To provide a clean comparison between such broad explanations, we refrain from using a
full-scale trade model. Instead, we take an original step by ‘importing’ a simple version of a
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popular information framework by Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999) that is
being used increasingly to explain market phenomena (e.g. Armstrong et al. 2009, Bar-Isaac
et al. 2012, Haan and Moraga-Gonza´lez 2011), and extending it into a trade context. To
ease exposition, we present the model within a partial equilibrium setting, although we also
show how it can be extended to provide a general equilibrium analysis.
In more detail, we consider a market for a single differentiated good with many potential
buyers and sellers, where buyers are distributed over multiple geographic regions. Given
sufficiently moderate entry costs, each region hosts a single seller. We assume that buyers
can trade freely with their ‘home’ seller. However, to trade with a ‘foreign’ seller, buyers must
first incur a cross-border information cost to identify and/or interpret the seller’s product
and price. This captures the possibility that information about foreign sellers is harder to
obtain, and/or harder to interpret as it may be presented in a different format or language.
Buyers can gather information about any number of foreign sellers under a sequential search
process, incurring the cross-border information cost each time. After having decided to stop
searching, a buyer can then exit, trade with its home seller, or trade with a searched foreign
seller. However, buying from a foreign seller may i) be less attractive due to the buyer’s
relative preference for home produce through localized tastes, and ii) require the buyer and/or
the foreign seller to further incur a trade cost, as consistent with various cross-border tariffs,
transportation costs, or transaction costs.
Sections 3-5 of the paper then derive the equilibrium, and demonstrate the different
mechanisms by which each form of trade barrier reduces cross-border trade and welfare.
After comparing the effects of buyer trade costs, seller trade costs, information frictions,
and localized tastes, we offer the striking result that information frictions often generate the
largest marginal effects. This arises because buyers’ optimal search behavior is relatively
more sensitive to the level of information frictions, which then makes them especially potent
in deterring buyers from considering offers from foreign sellers.
In addition, we also show how our findings can help understand a conflict within the
literature regarding the interaction between trade barriers and product differentiation. Some
evidence finds that the effects of trade barriers are weaker in markets with higher product
differentiation. However, other evidence is consistent with an argument made by Rauch
(1999) which asserts that markets with higher product differentiation should have larger
trade barriers because information search is relatively more costly. To help understand this
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debate, our model can illuminate the relevant theoretical mechanisms, and suggest an over-
arching explanation for the conflicting evidence.
Next, Section 6 considers some empirical implications from our main results and illus-
trates how our model could be used as the basis for an estimation approach. While there
is little direct evidence within the existing literature, a few papers report findings that are
consistent with our main prediction. For example, papers such as Fink et al. (2005), Gomez-
Herrera (2014), and Lendle et al. (2016), suggest that information cost proxies, including
telecommunication costs or the existence of a common language, are statistically more sig-
nificant in reducing cross-border trade than some more traditional trade barriers, such as
shipping costs and tariff levels.
Finally, Section 7 examines the robustness of our results with several extensions. First,
and most substantially, Section 7.1 considers our results under an alternative form of trade
cost. The main model assumes additive ‘per-unit’ trade costs that do not vary in the level of
a product’s price. As argued by Sørensen (2014) and the references therein, such trade costs
are common, and important both theoretically and empirically. However, we re-examine
our results under a more complex case of multiplicative ‘iceberg’ trade costs that vary in a
product’s price. Here, we provide conditions under which our main results remain robust,
and also show, in contrast to the main model, how seller trade costs can be more powerful
than buyer trade costs, and how the effects of buyer trade costs and localized tastes can be
separately identified. Sections 7.2-7.4 then consider the robustness of our results when sellers
cannot set different prices to home and foreign buyers, when there is any number of regions
n ≥ 2, and when there is more than a single seller in each region.
Our paper builds most closely on Wilson (2012) who uses a version of Wolinsky (1986) and
Anderson and Renault (1999) to examine the relative impact of search costs and switching
costs on market power and welfare. Here, we i) adapt and extend his analysis to a qualitatively
different multi-region trade context, ii) provide a general re-interpretation of his switching
cost variable to capture buyer (additive) trade costs and localized tastes, iii) analyze a new
variable to assess the effects of seller trade costs, iv) develop a measure of cross-border trade
and show how it, and other measures of welfare, vary with the considered trade barriers, v)
assess how these relationships vary with the level of product differentiation, and vi) extend
the results to include multiplicative trade costs.
More generally, our paper adds to the emerging theoretical literature on information and
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trade (e.g. Allen 2014, Alboronoz et al. 2012, Dasgupta and Mondria 2014, Eaton et al. 2014,
and Steinwender 2015). For instance, Steinwender (2015) presents a partial equilibrium model
to show how information frictions reduce average trade levels by delaying agents’ access to
market information. Closer to our approach are the papers by i) Allen (2014) who provides
a multi-region trade model where sellers undergo an optimal search process to find the best
regional price, and ii) Dasgupta and Mondria (2014) who consider information frictions in
the form of rational buyer inattention in order to provide a micro-foundation for the gravity
trade model. In contrast, we consider buyer information frictions in the form of optimal
buyer search, and provide a simple model to explicitly compare the power of information
frictions in determining cross-border trade and associated welfare relative to other forms of
trade barriers.
Our results also complement a number of recent empirical papers that document the
role of information in determining cross-border trade. For instance, Fink et al. (2005) and
Portes and Rey (2005) show how communication costs and communication traffic help explain
trade patterns, Allen (2014) finds evidence of substantial information frictions in regional
agriculture, and Steinwender (2015) details how improvements to transatlantic information
increased the volume and volatility of cotton trade. Other empirical work demonstrates
how borders still limit trade in online markets, while documenting the effects of information
frictions in the form of language differences or variations in the level of trust (Gomez-Herrara
et al. 2014, Hortac¸su et al. 2009, and Lendle et al. 2016). Our paper helps underpin this
research by demonstrating the relative theoretical significance of information frictions, and
by further understanding the channels by which information affects trade.
2 Model
Like Steinwender (2015), we focus on a partial equilibrium set-up.1 In particular, we consider
a market with many potential buyers and sellers, where each seller sells a single differentiated
product or ‘brand’. The market is divided across n regions. Like Allen (2014), and as
consistent with a global trading environment, we assume the number of regions is ‘large’,
n→∞.
1However, the presented utility function and the later welfare calculations can be micro-founded within a
wider general equilibrium framework. See Appendix A for more details.
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The buyers are symmetrically distributed across regions, and, without loss, the number
of buyers per region is normalized to one. Any buyer who chooses not to buy within the
market receives a zero outside option utility. However, within the market, each buyer has
quasi-linear preferences and a unit demand. In particular, excluding other potential trading
costs, let buyer m gain an indirect utility, umi = εmi − pi, if it buys from seller i at price
pi, where εmi is an idiosyncratic, privately-observed match value that reflects how buyer m
values seller i’s differentiated product. Each match εmi is drawn independently from [ε, ε]
with a uniform distribution, G(ε) =
(
ε−ε
µ
)
, with density g(ε) = 1
µ
, where ε ≥ 0, and where
µ ≡ (ε− ε) > 0.2
Each potential seller faces zero marginal production costs and a fixed entry cost, F ≥ 0.
Sellers can choose whether to enter the market and which region to locate in. For our main
analysis, we assume that the level of F at, and immediately around, equilibrium, is always
sufficiently moderate that only one seller is able to profitably locate within each region.
Having entered the market, our main model allows each seller to set different prices to
buyers from different regions. Under our later assumptions, this implies that each seller i
will find it optimal to set a ‘home’ price, pih, to buyers from its own region, and a ‘foreign’
price, pif , to buyers from all other regions.
Any trade between a buyer and seller within the same region is unrestricted. Specifically,
if buyer m and seller i are located in the same region, buyer m can freely learn i’s home price,
pih, and its match at i, εmi, and then choose to trade with i at zero cost. In contrast, any
trade between a buyer and a ‘foreign’ seller from a different region is open to a number of
frictions and barriers. In particular, to trade with a foreign seller j, buyer m must first incur
a cross-border information friction or ‘search cost’, c > 0, in order to identify and interpret
seller j’s foreign price, pjf , and its product match at j, εmj. In line with a standard sequential
search procedure, buyers can search any number of foreign sellers sequentially, incurring a
fixed cost of c each time, with the free ability to return to previously searched sellers. Hence,
after each search, a buyer can exit the market, keep searching further foreign sellers, trade
with its home seller, or trade with any searched foreign seller.
However, to trade with any searched foreign seller, the buyer and/or seller must further
incur a trade cost as consistent with various forms of cross-border tariffs, transportation
2Like Wilson (2012) and Armstrong et al. (2009), we use a uniform distribution for tractability. However,
at the very least, our results are likely to remain for cases where the density is not too increasing or decreasing.
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costs, or transaction costs. In our main model, we focus on additive ‘per-unit’ trade costs
and break them down into those borne by the buyer and seller, respectively. Thus, in any
foreign transaction, the buyer must incur a ‘buyer trade cost’ γb > 0 and the seller must
incur a ‘seller trade cost’ γs > 0. In this context, note that the buyer trade cost, γb, cannot
be separately identified from a buyer’s (perceived) dis-utility for foreign trade, as consistent
with localized tastes. Therefore, for brevity, we just denote these two explanations as a form
of buyer trade cost, γb. However, in Section 7.1, we later extend our results to allow for trade
costs with an alternative multiplicative ‘iceberg’ structure where the effects of buyer trade
costs and localized tastes are shown to differ.
We consider a one-shot game. In stage 1, each potential seller decides whether to enter
the market and which region to locate in. In stage 2, sellers each choose their prices, while
buyers form conjectures about the sellers’ prices and select their own strategies. Given the
offerings from any seller within buyer m’s home region, buyer m’s strategy must prescribe
how many and which foreign sellers to search, and which seller, if any, to trade with.
We focus on the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium. Given our assumption about
fixed costs, the equilibrium must have a single seller in each region. Each seller then sets a
home price, p∗h, and foreign price, p
∗
f . As all foreign sellers are identical ex ante, buyers are
indifferent over which foreign sellers to search. Hence, after freely observing the offer from its
home supplier, any buyer strategy must only prescribe whether to start searching the foreign
sellers, when to stop searching, and which seller to then trade with, if any.
3 Equilibrium
Given a single seller in each region, we now characterize the stage 2 equilibrium. First,
consider the optimal strategy for a buyer with home seller i, home price, pih, home match
value, εi, and the expectation that all other sellers set a foreign price, p
∗
f :
Lemma 1. Define the standard reservation utility, xˆ, as the unique value of x that solves
c =
∫ ε
x
(ε− x)g(ε)dε, such that xˆ = ε−√2cµ < ε. Then, the optimal buyer strategy involves:
Step 1: Search any foreign seller and move to Step 2 if max{0, εi − pih} < xˆ − γb − p∗f .
Otherwise, buy from home seller i if εi − pih > 0, and exit if not.
Step 2: After finding a foreign seller j with foreign price, pjf , and match, εj, stop search-
ing further foreign sellers only if εj ≥ xˆ+ pjf − p∗f , and then buy from j.
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As seller trade costs, γs, do not influence optimal buyer behavior for a given set of prices,
this result follows as a simple modification and re-interpretation of Lemma 1 in Wilson (2012)
and so we omit its proof. However, because the result forms the platform for our remaining
analysis, we now provide a detailed account of its intuition.
The full optimal search problem can be condensed to two steps. In Step 1, a buyer decides
whether to start searching beyond its home seller. Using standard induction arguments, this
optimally reduces to a seemingly myopic comparison between the buyer’s effective home offer,
max{0, εi−pih}, and the expected gains from searching one foreign seller.3 To calculate these
latter expected gains from searching, note that the buyer would only prefer the searched
foreign offer (net of buyer trade costs), εj − p∗f − γb, to its effective home offer if εj >
max{0, εi − pih}+ p∗f + γb ≡ x. Thus, given a cost of search, c, the expected net gains are
−c+
∫ x
ε
max{0, εi − pih}g(εj)dεj +
∫ ε
x
(εj − p∗f − γb)g(εj)dεj (1)
Equating this to the effective home offer then implies that the buyer is indifferent over
whether to start searching when c =
∫ ε
x
(ε − x)g(ε)dε which gives the expression for xˆ in
Lemma 1. As consistent with Step 1, the buyer will then only start searching when x < xˆ or
equivalently, when max{0, εi − pih} < xˆ − γb − p∗f . If the buyer decides not to search, then
it buys from its home seller if εi − pih > 0 and otherwise exits. If the buyer does decide to
start searching the foreign sellers, then it moves to Step 2.
In Step 2, after searching, if the buyer finds a foreign offer that is inferior to that provided
by the home seller then clearly it should continue searching. However, on finding a foreign
offer from some seller j that exceeds the buyer’s home offer, εj − pjf − γb > max{0, εi− pih},
the buyer then faces a more substantial decision of whether or not to keep searching further
foreign sellers. Using similar logic to above, this optimally reduces to a myopic comparison
between the current foreign offer εj − pjf − γb and the expected net benefits of making one
further search to discover an additional offer from some foreign seller l, εl − p∗f − γb. To
3In more detail, to show why Step 1 remains optimal when considering the expected gains from searching
any number of sellers β ≥ 1, initially suppose β = 2. First, if search was optimal under the original Step
1, then search must also be optimal when β = 2. Second, suppose that search was not optimal under the
original Step 1. If, instead, the buyer searches, it will be optimal to search only one seller because after
making one search, the original Step 1 will apply such that it will be optimal to stop. Hence, as claimed, the
decision under β = 2 is, in fact, only a decision between stopping immediately and making one more search.
This argument can then be expanded for higher levels of β.
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calculate these expected gains, note that the buyer would only prefer the new foreign offer,
εl − p∗f − γb, to its current foreign offer if εl > εj − (pjf − p∗f ) ≡ x′. Thus, given a cost of
search, c, the expected net gains are
−c+
∫ x′
ε
(εj − pjf − γb)g(εl)dεl +
∫ ε
x′
(εl − p∗f − γb)g(εl)dεl (2)
Equating this to the current foreign home offer then implies that the buyer is indifferent
over whether to start searching when c =
∫ ε
x′(ε− x′)g(ε)dε which is also consistent with the
expression for xˆ in Lemma 1. In line with Step 2, the buyer will then only stop searching and
buy when x′ ≥ xˆ or equivalently, when εj ≥ xˆ+ pjf − p∗f . Note, this decision is independent
of buyer trade costs, γb, because the buyer will always buy from either the current foreign
seller or another foreign seller and therefore incur γb regardless.
Finally, note that if the buyer chooses to start searching in Step 1, then it will always
eventually find a better foreign deal and so never return to buy from its home seller because
n→∞.
We now move on to establishing equilibrium prices. First, from Step 1, no buyer will ever
search in equilibrium if max{0, ε−p∗h} ≥ xˆ−γb−p∗f . This generates zero foreign trade and so
from this point forward, we focus on the more interesting case where the following condition
holds in equilibrium:
max{0, ε− p∗h} < xˆ− γb − p∗f (Condition 1)
Now consider seller i’s residual home demand when all other sellers set a foreign price,
p∗f :
Dih(pih; p
∗
f ) = 1−G(xˆ− γb + pih − p∗f ) (3)
This derives from i’s home buyers who do not search. To not search, such buyers must
have εi such that max{0, εi − pih} ≥ xˆ − γb − p∗f . They will then always buy from i rather
than exiting because it follows that εi − pih > 0 via Condition 1. Therefore, the probability
that a buyer purchases at home is 1−G(xˆ− γb + pih − p∗f ).
Next, consider i’s residual foreign demand when all other sellers set home and foreign
prices, p∗h and p
∗
f :
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Dif (pif ; p
∗
h, p
∗
f ) = G(xˆ− γb + p∗h − p∗f ) ·
1
(1−G(xˆ)) · (1−G(xˆ+ pif − p
∗
f )) (4)
To derive this equation, note that any given buyer that is foreign to region i starts
searching from their home seller with probability G(xˆ−γb+p∗h−p∗f ). Hence, when aggregated
across all foreign regions, we know that (n−1)G(xˆ−γb+p∗h−p∗f ) foreign buyers start searching.
The probability that any such foreign buyer then searches i at any point during their search
process equals 1
(n−1) [1+G(xˆ)+G(xˆ)
2+ ...+G(xˆ)n−2] = 1
(n−1)
∑n−2
k=0 G(xˆ)
k = 1
(n−1)
(
1−G(xˆ)n−1
1−G(xˆ)
)
because buyers i) select which sellers to search randomly, and ii) then keep searching beyond
any searched seller k 6= i with the probability that εk < xˆ, G(xˆ). Then, conditional on
searching i, we know a foreign buyer buys at i with the probability that εi ≥ xˆ + pif − p∗f ,
which equals 1−G(xˆ+ pif − p∗f ). Hence, for large n, Dif (.) collapses to (4).
Given these demand functions, each seller then maximizes its total profits, where the
revenue from any foreign buyer is also subject to the seller trade cost, γs:
Maxpih,pif pii(.) = pihDih(pih; p
∗
f ) + (pif − γs)Dif (pif ; p∗h, p∗f )− F (5)
Proposition 1 then follows, where each price reflects the relevant information frictions and
trade costs as explained further within the next section. (All proofs are listed in Appendix
B unless stated otherwise).
Proposition 1. The unique symmetric equilibrium prices are:
p∗h =
√
2cµ+
γs + γb
2
(6)
p∗f =
√
2cµ+ γs (7)
4 Cross-Border Trade
The equilibrium proportion of buyers that trade with a foreign seller, Dif (p
∗
f ; p
∗
h, p
∗
f ), forms a
natural measure of cross-border trade in our context. Using (4), note that this is equivalent
to the proportion of buyers that search in equilibrium, G(xˆ + p∗h − p∗f − γb). By re-labeling
Dif (p
∗
f ; p
∗
h, p
∗
f ) as T , and expanding, we can then state:
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T = G(xˆ+ p∗h − p∗f − γb) = G
(
xˆ−
(γs + γb
2
))
= 1−
√
2c
µ
−
(γs + γb
2µ
)
(8)
We now consider how marginal changes in the trade barriers, γb, γs, and c, affect our cross-
border trade measure, T . Such changes affect T either directly, and/or indirectly through
their effects on prices.
First, with reference to (9) below, consider the effects on T from an increase in buyers’
trade costs (or the dis-utility of foreign trade), γb. There is no effect on p
∗
f because additional
foreign search decisions are independent of γb, ∂p
∗
f/∂γb = 0. However, an increase in γb i)
allows sellers to raise p∗h because trading with a foreign seller is now more costly, ∂p
∗
h/∂γb =
0.5, and ii) produces a larger off-setting direct effect in deterring buyers from starting to search
any foreign sellers, such that cross-border trade, T , decreases. (We postpone discussing the
role of µ until the next sub-section.)
∂T
∂γb
=
1
µ
[∂p∗h
∂γb
− ∂p
∗
f
∂γb
− 1
]
= − 1
2µ
< 0 (9)
Second, consider an increase in sellers’ trade costs, γs, (10). This produces no direct
effect. However, it prompts sellers to raise p∗f by increasing their costs of foreign transactions,
∂p∗f/∂γs = 1. In turn, this softens competition and so also induces a smaller rise in p
∗
h,
∂p∗h/∂γs = 0.5. This net price change deters buyers from searching and so decreases T .
∂T
∂γs
=
1
µ
[∂p∗h
∂γs
− ∂p
∗
f
∂γs
]
= − 1
2µ
< 0 (10)
While their mechanisms differ, (9) and (10) show that the marginal effects from γb and
γs are equal. Hence, in this context, our measure of cross-border trade is independent of
whether trade costs are borne by sellers or buyers. However, as later shown in Section 7.1,
this result changes when trade costs have an alternative ‘iceberg’ structure.
Now consider an increase in information frictions, c, (11). An increase in c deters search
in Step 1 and Step 2 in the same way via xˆ. This prompts sellers to raise p∗h and p
∗
f by
an equal amount such that the price effects on T cancel. This leaves only a direct effect in
deterring buyers from starting to search, ∂xˆ
∂c
= − (ε−ε)
(ε−xˆ) = −
√
µ
2c
< −1, which decreases T .
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∂T
∂c
=
1
µ
[∂xˆ
∂c
+
∂p∗h
∂c
− ∂p
∗
f
∂c
]
=
1
µ
· ∂xˆ
∂c
= − 1√
2cµ
< 0 (11)
We can then state:
Proposition 2. The marginal effect from an increase in information frictions, c, on reducing
cross-border trade, T , is always larger than the marginal effect from an increase in buyer trade
costs, γb, or seller trade costs, γs.
Regardless of the levels of search costs, buyer trade costs or seller trade costs, search
costs always have the relatively more powerful marginal effect on the level of cross-border
trade. This suggests that a unit reduction in search costs will generate a larger increase in
cross-border trade than a unit reduction in buyer or seller trade costs. Hence, while the op-
timal policy decision will also depend upon the associated resource costs of each intervention
and other potential factors, this suggests that an authority seeking to increase cross-border
trade may prefer to improve the provision of buyer information at the margin rather than
implementing lower trade costs.
As a policy example, consider the European Commission’s Digital Agenda which has not
yet reached its target for 20% of European citizens to engage in online cross-border trans-
actions (see Gomez-Herrara et al. 2014 and European Commission 2015). To encourage
cross-border trade, our results suggest that improvements in broadband speed or the pro-
motion of multi-lingual websites may be more effective than the reduction of trade costs
associated with cross-border payment systems or delivery costs.
The intuition Proposition 2 is rather subtle, and one must take care to avoid some mis-
leading explanations. For instance, the result does not derive from the fact that trade costs
can only be incurred once and yet information frictions can be incurred multiple times by
searching different sellers. Instead, as shown in (11), information frictions provide a more
powerful determinant of the border effect because of their specific effects in discouraging
buyers to search foreign sellers via the reservation utility, xˆ. From Step 1 of Lemma 1, this
reservation utility derives from the optimal, yet seemingly-myopic, comparison between a
buyer’s effective home offer and their expected net gains from searching one foreign seller.
In particular, when assessing the expected net gains, (1), a buyer views information frictions
as a particularly powerful deterrent as they know that c will be incurred with certainty, but
that trade costs, γb and γs (via p
∗
f ), will only be incurred with the lesser probability that
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the next search leads to the discovery of a foreign offer that is attractive enough to induce a
cross-border transaction.
4.1 The Role of Product Differentiation
At this point, it is useful to consider the role of product differentiation within our results, as
captured by the range of possible match values, µ ≡ (ε− ε). In an influential paper, Rauch
(1999) asserts that markets with higher product differentiation should have higher barriers
to trade because the associated information search is more costly. While some evidence
is consistent with this (e.g. Lendle 2016 and Rauch 1999), other evidence suggests the
opposite result. For instance, Evans (2003) finds that markets with higher levels of product
differentiation have lower border effects, while Fink et al. (2005) show that such markets
are less sensitive to trade barriers and distance. To help better understand the interactions
between product differentiation, information search, and cross-border trade, one can use
(8)-(11) to show that:
Proposition 3. An increase in product differentiation, µ, increases cross-border trade, T ,
and weakens the associated marginal effects from information frictions, c, and trade costs, γb
and γs.
An increase in product differentiation, µ, generates several subtle effects that are not
typically considered within the literature. First, it raises the equilibrium prices, p∗h and p
∗
f .
Depending on the net effect on (p∗h − p∗f ) this could either encourage or discourage cross-
border trade. However, in our model, we see from (6) and (7) that the two prices rise by
the same amount and so the net price effect is zero. Second, and increase in µ encourages
buyers to begin searching the foreign sellers and to search more foreign sellers by increasing
the potential gains from cross-border trade. Hence, while this increases the total number
of equilibrium searches, C = nT · 1
1−G(xˆ) = nT
√
µ
2c
, and the total resources spent on search
activity, cC, it produces a higher level of cross-border trade, T , and weakens the importance
of each trade barrier in (9)-(11).
These results are consistent with evidence, such as Evans (2003) and Fink et al. (2005),
but inconsistent with the evidence supporting Rauch (1999). To generate results in line with
Rauch, one needs to allow the cost of each individual search, c, to be sufficiently increasing
in the level of product differentiation, µ, as consistent with the possibility that relatively
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more differentiated products require more time to assess. With this modification, our model
can then help provide an over-arching explanation for the conflicting evidence. When c′(µ)
is sufficiently low, an increase in µ increases trade, but when c′(µ) is sufficiently high, an
increase in µ can reduce trade.
5 Welfare
We now extend the spirit of our main result, Proposition 2, to compare how the considered
trade barriers affect welfare. However, to avoid any awkward conceptual comparisons, we
drop the localized tastes dis-utility interpretation of γb.
Proposition 4. Relative to a marginal increase in seller trade costs, γs, or buyer trade costs,
γb, a marginal increase in information frictions, c, always leads to a greater increase in seller
profits, and a larger reduction in buyer surplus and total welfare.
For any level of c, γb, and γs, this result suggests that buyer surplus, seller profits, and
total welfare are more sensitive to the level of search costs than the level of buyer or seller
trade costs. With all else constant, this strengthens the implications of Proposition 2, and
further points to the potential policy value of improving buyer information.
To understand the result further, first consider seller profits. Using (5) and (8), a seller’s
equilibrium profits can be expressed as pi∗i = p
∗
h(1 − T ) + (p∗f − γs)T − F , where it can also
be shown that p∗h > p
∗
f − γs. Then relative to the trade costs, γs and γb, information frictions
always increase profits by a larger amount because they produce a bigger marginal effect in
raising p∗h, p
∗
f , and (1− T ).
Now consider the effects of a marginal increase in any of the explanatory variables on
buyer surplus. These effects are more complex. However, by adapting standard envelope-
arguments from Wilson (2012), we know that any indirect effects on buyer surplus that result
from a change in buyer behavior are only second-order in magnitude. This follows because
such buyers must have previously been indifferent between the relevant actions in order for
the marginal change to have had any qualitative effect on their behavior. Hence, the only
possible first-order direct effects on buyer surplus stem from i) any increase in prices, for
given levels of existing home and foreign demand, and ii) any increase in the resource costs of
existing search activity or existing cross-border transactions. Due to their relative potency in
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influencing buyers’ search decisions, the proof then verifies that information frictions provide
the relatively larger marginal effect because they generate larger marginal price effects on p∗h
and p∗f , and larger marginal resource costs.
Finally, consider total welfare. As all buyers buy in equilibrium, we know that the effects
of any increased prices only result in a welfare transfer from buyers to sellers. Therefore,
using our previous arguments, the only first-order effects concern the increase in resource
costs of existing search activity or existing cross-border transactions. From above, it then
follows that information frictions provide the relatively larger marginal effect.
6 Empirical Implications
We now consider some empirical implications from our model. In particular, we illustrate
how our measure for cross-border trade, T , could be used as the basis for an estimation
approach.
Within a considered product market, h, let the measure of cross-border trade, Thr, denote
the proportion of buyers in region r that buy from a foreign seller. If this statistic is not
directly available, it can be calculated by using Thr ≡ Vhrp∗f ·N , where N is the total number of
buyers of product h in region r, Vhr is the value of the imports of product h into region r, and
p∗f is the relevant import price. By using the right-hand-side of (8), we can then then write
Thr ≡ Vhrp∗fN = 1−
√
2
µ
· c0.5 − γs
2µ
− γb
2µ
. Hence, with the use of suitable proxies for the level of
information frictions and trade costs, this suggests the estimation of an equation with form
Thr ≡ Vhrp∗fN = α + β1c
0.5 + β2γs + β3γs where our past results predict i) β1 < β2, β3 < 0, ii)
β2 = β3 (under additive trade costs), and iii) that each coefficient will be weaker in markets
with higher levels of product differentiation, µ.
Some evidence for prediction iii) has already been discussed in Section 4.1. There is
little existing empirical work to consider prediction ii). However, some related support for
our main prediction i) can be found within the existing literature. Much of the literature
employs gravity estimates to explain the value of exports between one country and another
as a function of the country size, distance, and relevant trade barriers (see the surveys
by Anderson and van Wincoop 2004 and Head and Mayer 2013). While no formal tests
are provided to compare our variables of interest, a few papers report that information
cost proxies, such as telecommunication costs or the existence of a common language, are
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statistically more significant in reducing cross-border trade than some more traditional trade
costs, such as shipping costs or tariff levels (e.g. Fink et al. 2005, Gomez-Herrera 2014, and
Lendle et al. 2016). Future work in this direction would be useful to further test our model
and explicitly compare the effects of different forms of trade barriers.
7 Extensions
In this final section, we consider the robustness of our results with respect to i) alternative
forms of trade costs, ii) single ‘world’ prices, iii) a smaller, finite number of regions, and iv)
multiple sellers per region.
7.1 Alternative Trade Costs
The main model focused on additive ‘per-unit’ trade costs, γb and γs. As argued by Sørensen
(2014) and the references therein, such trade costs are common, and important both theo-
retically and empirically. However, we now consider an alternative case with multiplicative
‘iceberg’ trade costs that are proportional to a product’s price.
Here, when a buyer trades with a foreign seller j at foreign price pjf , buyer trade costs are
given by γbj = φbpjf and seller trade costs are given by γsj = φspjf , where φb > 0 and φs > 0
reflect the strength of the relevant buyer and seller trade barriers, respectively. Unlike the
main model, marginal production costs, k ≥ 0, now become important because they affect
the equilibrium level of buyer and seller trade costs, φbp
∗
f and φsp
∗
f , via their effects on the
equilibrium foreign price, p∗f .
If information frictions also follow a multiplicative structure, then it is straightforward to
show that our results remain robust. However, information frictions are unlikely to have such
a structure because the costs of identifying a seller’s offer are not dependent upon the actual
price charged. This makes the comparison more complex, but we can state the following
(where all the derivations and proofs for this sub-section are given in Appendix C):
Proposition 5. Under iceberg trade costs, information frictions still exert the relatively
larger marginal effect on cross-border trade, buyer surplus, seller profits and total welfare,
when marginal production costs, k, are sufficiently small.
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Proposition 5 confirms our main results when k is sufficiently small. When production
costs are small, the equilibrium foreign price is relatively low, and so the effects of a marginal
change in the strength of buyer trade costs, φb, or seller trade costs, φs, remain smaller than
the effects from a marginal change in information frictions. However, when production costs
and the resultant equilibrium foreign price are sufficiently large, the effects of a marginal
change in the strength of buyer or seller trade costs can dominate the effects of a marginal
change in information frictions.
Finally, we note two other interesting features of the ‘iceberg’ model that differ to the
main model. First, the marginal effect from an increase in the strength of seller trade costs,
φs, in reducing cross-border, T , is always larger than the marginal effect from an increase
in the strength of buyer trade costs, φb, when k > 0. This differs to the main model where
increases in buyer and seller trade costs, γs and γb, reduced cross-border trade by an equal
amount. The intuition is complex. However, because increases in φs are borne directly by
sellers, a marginal increase in φs prompts a relatively large increase in the equilibrium foreign
price, p∗f . Despite being partially offset by a resulting increase in the equilibrium home price,
p∗h, this ensures that cross-border trade is more sensitive to the strength of seller, rather than
buyer, trade costs.
Second, unlike the main model, the iceberg model allows us to separately identify the
effects of localized tastes from the effects of buyer trade costs under the assumption that
the (preference-based) dis-utility of trading with a foreign seller, γb, remains independent of
prices. One can then use similar reasoning to Proposition 5, to show that the marginal effect
from an increase in localized tastes, γb, on reducing cross-border trade, T , is larger than the
marginal effect from an increase in the strength of buyer or seller trade costs, φb and φs,
when marginal production costs, k, are sufficiently small. Hence, at the margin, while still
dominated by the effects of information frictions, localized tastes may provide a relatively
more powerful barrier to cross-border trade than buyer or seller trade costs in markets for
low-value goods.
7.2 Single Prices
The main model assumed that each seller i could set different prices to buyers from different
regions. Here, we now consider an alternative case where each seller i can only set a single
17
‘world’ price to all buyers, with pif = pih = pi:
Proposition 6. When each seller can only set a single price to all buyers, information
frictions still exert the relatively larger marginal effect on cross-border trade, and total welfare.
In the resulting symmetric equilibrium, the sellers set a single price p∗, such that the
cross-border trade measure in (8) now equals T = Dif (p
∗; p∗) = G(xˆ− γb). This measure is
independent of prices, and so the associated price effects in (9)-(11) become neutralized. This
leaves only the direct effects, which we know favor information frictions due to their relative
power in deterring foreign trade. In terms of welfare, the existence of a single price makes it
difficult to explicitly rank the relative comparative statics for seller profits and buyer surplus.
However, by applying our previous logic, one can still show that information frictions exert
the largest effect on total welfare.
7.3 Finite Number of Regions
The main model assumed the number of regions, n, was ‘large’. For alternative cases with
any n ≥ 2, the analysis becomes difficult due to the existence of ‘return’ buyers who search
all regions without stopping but then decide to return to buy from a previously searched
seller. Related difficulties are well-known in applications of the Wolinsky (1986)/Anderson
and Renault (1999) framework, but these are particularly acute in our trade context. Hence,
like other papers that seek tractability, such as Bar-Isaac et (2012), our main model assumed
n→∞ to ensure that no buyer ever returns to a previous seller.
However, it is also possible to derive our main results for some cases with any n ≥ 2.
To consider the simplest example, we now build on the single price setting from Section 7.2
(with p∗f = p
∗
h = p
∗) under a scenario of market coverage where all buyers buy in equilibrium.
Proposition 7. Under single prices and market coverage, information frictions still exert
the relatively larger marginal effect on cross-border trade and total welfare for any number of
regions, n ≥ 2.
The measure of cross border trade, T = Dif (p
∗; p∗), now derives from two sources. First,
similar to the main model, there are G(xˆ−γb)(1−G(xˆ)n−1) ‘fresh’ foreign buyers that search
and find it optimal to stop and buy from i. Second, however, there is now a positive number
of foreign buyers that search all sellers without finding it optimal to stop, but then choose to
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return to buy from seller i. As derived in the proof, the number of such ‘return’ buyers under
market coverage equals (n − 1) ∫ xˆ
ε+γb
G(ε)n−2G(ε − γb)g(ε)dε. After some simplification, we
can then write T = G(xˆ − γb) − 1n [G(xˆ)n − G(ε + γb)n]. Intuitively, for similar reasoning
to Section 7.2, cross-border trade remains independent of prices, and is still most sensitive
to information frictions. In addition, an increase in the number of regions now expands
cross-border trade by increasing the probability that buyers find a high foreign match value.
7.4 Multiple Sellers per Region
Solving the market equilibrium for an arbitrary level of fixed costs such that Ψ ≥ 1 sellers
operate in each region is difficult. Our main results considered a tractable case with moderate
fixed costs where Ψ = 1. The model is also tractable for very low fixed costs with Ψ → ∞;
however, such an equilibrium then exhibits zero cross-border trade as buyers can always find
a perfect match value within their home region. For the remaining cases with Ψ ∈ (1,∞), we
speculate that our results will remain robust. Suppose it costs buyers ch ∈ [0, c] to identify
each home seller’s offer. Then, following Weitzman’s (1979) optimal search rule, buyers will
optimally search their home sellers first before any foreign sellers. Therefore, the decision
of whether to start searching any foreign sellers with Ψ > 1 existing home offers will be
qualitatively similar to that in the main model with Ψ = 1. Hence, it is likely that a form of
our results and documented mechanisms will remain.
8 Conclusion
This paper has extended a simple version of a popular information framework (Anderson
and Renault 1999 and Wolinsky 1986) into a trade context in order to compare three broad
forms of trade barriers. The traditionally under-researched role of information frictions was
found to often generate the relatively larger marginal effect in reducing cross-border trade,
and associated welfare.
We hope that future research can build on our work in at least three ways. First, further
work should generalize, expand, and test our findings to develop the implication that poli-
cymakers may wish to focus more on information-based policy remedies in order to better
promote trade and globalization. Second, future work would be useful to widen our com-
parison to include additional trade barriers, such as an explicit analysis of the information-
19
related ‘trust’ mechanism recently highlighted empirically by Hortac¸su et al. (2009) and
Lendle et al. (2016). However, the addition of this mechanism is only likely to strengthen
our findings about the relative importance of information in determining trade. Finally, and
more generally, we hope that future research can build on our framework to analyze further
information-related trade questions.
Appendix A: General Equilibrium Foundation
In this appendix, we show how the presented utility function and welfare calculations within
the main model can be micro-founded within a wider general equilibrium framework. Suppose
there are two sectors: the considered sector, X, together with sector Y which produces an
outside numeraire good using labor inputs under perfect competition and constant returns
to scale. The real wage therefore equals the level of labor productivity in sector Y , y. Now
consider a buyer and seller in sector X. Under our assumption of unit demand, X ∈ {0, 1},
and given a price p and buyer match value ε, suppose the buyer has a quasi-linear utility
function, u = εX + Y . The budget constraint, pX + Y ≤ y will hold with equality given the
marginal utility of Y equals one. Therefore, the buyer optimally buys X if ε + y − p > y
or ε > p, which then implies u = ε − p + y. Hence, one can use u = ε − p as in the main
model without loss because i) all buyers buy in equilibrium and, ii) our results only consider
changes in welfare which are independent of the level of real wage, y.
Appendix B: Main Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: With use of (3) and (4), pii in (5) is continuous and quasi-concave
in both pif and pih over the relevant range. Hence, when evaluated at equilibrium, i) the
FOC with respect to pif gives the unique price; (7), and ii) the FOC with respect to pih gives
p∗h =
1
2
[ε− xˆ+ p∗f + γb], which after substituting for p∗f gives the unique price; (6).
Proof of Proposition 2: From (9)-(11), we require ∂T
∂c
= − 1√
2cµ
= − 1
(ε−xˆ) to be more
negative than ∂T
∂γs
= ∂T
∂γs
= − 1
2µ
. This requires 2(ε−ε)
(ε−xˆ) > 1 and follows because i) xˆ < ε from
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Lemma 1, and ii) xˆ > ε + (γs+γb)
2
> ε from Condition 1 when evaluated with equilibrium
prices.
Proof of Proposition 4: First, consider a seller’s profits, pi∗i = p
∗
h(1−T )+(p∗f −γs)T −F .
Using (6)-(11), we can then state that
∂pi∗i
∂c
= −∂xˆ
∂c
[1 + γs+γb
2µ
] is strictly larger than
∂pi∗i
∂γs
=
1
2
[(1 +T ) + γs+γb
2µ
] > 0 and
∂pi∗i
∂γb
= 1
2
[(1−T ) + γs+γb
2µ
] > 0 by using (1−T ) ∈ (0, 1) and −∂xˆ
∂c
> 1
from past results. Second, consider buyer surplus and denote C as the equilibrium number of
searches, and S as the equilibrium number of cross-border transactions. From the text, the
only possible first-order effects from a marginal change in an explanatory variable, z, involve
the effects on i) increased prices for given levels of demand, n[
∂p∗h
∂z
(1−T )+ ∂p
∗
f
∂z
T ], ii) increased
total resource costs for existing search activity, C ∂c
∂z
, and iii) increased total resource costs
for existing cross-border transactions, S ∂(γb+γs)
∂z
. Information frictions, c, then produce the
larger total marginal effect. This follows because i) they produce larger marginal effects on
both p∗h in (6) and p
∗
f in (7) as −∂xˆ∂c > 1, and ii) because they produce larger resource effects
as the equilibrium number of searches, C, is strictly larger than the equilibrium number of
cross-border transactions, S, with C
S
=
G(xˆ−γb+p∗h−p∗f )· 1(1−G(xˆ))
G(xˆ−γb+p∗h−p∗f )
> 1. Finally, using the text, the
proof for total welfare follows immediately as we need only consider the resource effects in
ii) above.
Proof of Proposition 6: Lemma 1 remains with pi = pih = pif and p
∗ = p∗h = p
∗
f . Then,
with the assumption that γs is not so high that it prevents profitable trade to foreign regions,
and under a revised Condition 1: max{0, ε−p∗} < xˆ−γb−p∗, each seller i must now maximize
pii(.) = piDih(pi; p
∗) + (pi − γs)Dif (pi; p∗) − F where Dih(pi; p∗) = 1 − G(xˆ − γb + pi − p∗)
and Dif (pi; p
∗) = G(xˆ − γb) · 1(1−G(xˆ)) · (1 − G(xˆ + pi − p∗)). The resulting equilibrium price
is p∗ = µ(1−G(xˆ))+γs[G(xˆ−γb)]
1−G(xˆ)+G(xˆ−γb) . The measure for cross-border trade is now independent of prices
as T = Dif (p
∗; p∗) = G(xˆ− γb). Therefore, by modifying the arguments of Proposition 2, we
know that ∂T
∂c
= 1
µ
· ∂xˆ
∂c
is strictly more negative than ∂T
∂γb
= − 1
µ
and ∂T
∂γs
= 0. Finally, for total
welfare, using past arguments, we only require the equilibrium ratio of total searches to total
cross-border transactions to exceed one. This still follows as
G(xˆ−γb)· 1(1−G(xˆ))
G(xˆ−γb) > 1.
Proof of Proposition 7: Following the discussion below the Proposition, we first note
that i’s equilibrium ‘fresh’ demand can be expressed as G(xˆ− γb)(1−G(xˆ)n−1). This follows
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by noting that Step 1 and Step 2 of Lemma 1 remain unchanged, and then using the text
below (4) in the main model. This can then be rewritten as G(xˆ−γb)−G(xˆ)n+(γb/µ)G(xˆ)n−1
as G(xˆ− γb) = G(xˆ)− (γb/µ) under the uniform distribution.
Second, we derive seller i’s foreign return demand in equilibrium under the assumption
of market coverage such that i always offers positive surplus, ε − p∗ − γb ≥ 0. Intuitively,
any one of i’s (n − 1) potential foreign buyers will search all sellers and then return to
buy from i if they i) start searching from some foreign region j 6= i, εj < xˆ − γb, ii) do
not stop at i, εi < xˆ, and iii) do not stop at any other seller k 6= i, j, εk < xˆ, but then
return to buy from i rather than iv) j, εi − p∗ − γb ≥ εj − p∗, or v) any other k 6= i, j,
εi − p∗ − γb ≥ εk − p∗ − γb. Note i) and iii) do not bind, and that the probability that iv)
holds is zero unless εi ≥ ε + γb. Hence, the total expected number of foreign buyers that
return to i equals (n− 1) ∫ xˆ
ε+γb
G(ε)n−2G(ε− γb)g(ε)dε. Under the uniform distribution, this
can be re-written because
(
n−1
n
)
G(xˆ)n − (γb
µ
)
G(xˆ)n−1 + 1
n
G(ε+ γb)
n.
Third, by combining the above expressions for i’s fresh and return demand, we gain
T = D∗if (.) = G(xˆ − γb) − 1n [G(xˆ)n − G(ε + γb)n]. It then follows that ∂T∂γb = − 1µ [1 − G(ε +
γb)
n−1] < 0, ∂T
∂γs
= 0, and ∂T
∂c
= 1
µ
· ∂xˆ
∂c
[1−G(xˆ)n−1] < 0. Information frictions have the largest
effect if H = ∂T
∂γb
− ∂T
∂γc
> 0. Using Condition 1 and past results, this can be shown as i)
Hn=2 = 1−
(
µ−γb
µ
)
> 0, and ii) ∂H
∂n
> 0.
Finally, for total welfare, after modifying past arguments, we still require the equilibrium
ratio of total searches to total cross-border transactions to exceed one. This follows as i) all
cross-border transactions involve at least one search, and ii) there is now a positive number
of buyers who search all sellers but return to buy from their home seller.
Appendix C: Derivations for Alternative Trade Costs
This appendix provides a full derivation for the results of Section 7.1 by considering a model
with i) information frictions, c, ii) iceberg buyer and seller trade costs, γbj = φbpjf and
γsj = φspjf , iii) marginal production costs, k ≥ 0, and iv) the possibility of localized tastes,
γb ≥. First, consider the optimal strategy for a buyer with home seller i, given home price,
pih, home match, εi, and the expectation that all other sellers set a foreign price, p
∗
f .
Claim 1. Under iceberg trade costs, the optimal buyer strategy involves:
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Step 1: Search any foreign seller and move to Step 2 if max{0, εi−pih} < xˆ−p∗f (1+φb)−γb.
Otherwise, buy from home seller i if εi − pih > 0, and exit if not.
Step 2: After finding a foreign seller j with foreign price, pjf , and match, εj, stop search-
ing further foreign sellers only if εj ≥ xˆ+ (pjf − p∗f )(1 + φb), and then buy from j.
Claim 1 follows a simple adaptation of Lemma 1. In brief, it can be derived as follows.
For Step 1, a buyer now expects to discover a first foreign offer of εj − p∗f − φbp∗f − γb. By
following the steps in the main model, it can be verified that the buyer will start search
only if max{0, εi − pih} < xˆ− p∗f (1 + φb)− γb. For Step 2, a buyer now compares a current
foreign offer εj − pjf − φbpjf − γb with an expected new offer of εl − p∗f − φbp∗f − γb. By
following the steps in the main model, it can be verified that the buyer will stop and buy if
εj ≥ xˆ+ (pjf − p∗f )(1 + φb). Note in contrast to the main model, buyer trade costs matter in
Step 2 if pjf 6= p∗f because they are now price dependent. However, localized tastes remain
irrelevant.
Claim 2. Under iceberg trade costs, the unique symmetric equilibrium prices are:
p∗h =
√
2cµ+
γb
2
+
k
2
(
1 +
1 + φb
1− φs
)
(C.1)
p∗f =
(√2cµ
1 + φb
)
+
( k
1− φs
)
(C.2)
To derive this, one can first ensure that some buyers search by stating a new version of
Condition 1, max{0, ε− p∗h} < xˆ− p∗f (1 + φb)− γb. Seller i’s residual home demand when all
other sellers set a foreign price, p∗f , now equalsDih(pih; p
∗
f ) = 1−G(xˆ+pih−p∗f (1+φb)−γb), and
seller i’s residual foreign demand when all other sellers set home and foreign prices, p∗h and p
∗
f
is now Dif (pif ; p
∗
h, p
∗
f ) = G(xˆ+p
∗
h−p∗f (1+φb)−γb)· 1(1−G(xˆ)) ·(1−G(xˆ+(pif−p∗f )(1+φb))). Given
these demand functions, each seller then maximizes its total profits, where there is a marginal
production cost, k ≥ 0, and where the revenue from any foreign buyer is subject to the seller
iceberg trade cost, φspif : pii(.) = (pih − k)Dih(pih; p∗f ) + (pif − k − φspif )Dif (pif ; p∗h, p∗f )− F .
When evaluated at equilibrium, i) the FOC with respect to pif leads to (C.2) directly, and
ii) the FOC with respect to pih leads to 2p
∗
h = k + (ε − xˆ) + (1 + φb)p∗f + γb which after
substitution gives (C.1).
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Claim 3. Under iceberg trade costs, we can define the cross-border trade measure, T , as
T = Dif (p
∗
f ; p
∗
h, p
∗
f ) = G(xˆ+ p
∗
h − p∗f (1 + φb)− γb) = G
(
xˆ− γb
2
− k
2
(φs + φb
1− φs
))
(C.3)
We are now ready to state the proof for Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 5: First, consider cross-border trade, T . Using (C.3), it follows
that i) ∂T
∂φb
= − k
2µ(1−φs) < 0, ii)
∂T
∂φs
= − k(1+φb)
2µ(1−φs)2 < 0, and iii)
∂T
∂c
= 1
µ
· ∂xˆ
∂c
< 0. Using
∂xˆ
∂c
= − (ε−ε)
(ε−xˆ) < −1 from past results, it then follows that ∂T∂c is more negative than ∂T∂φb and
∂T
∂φs
when k is sufficiently small.
Second, consider equilibrium seller profits, which can be rewritten as pi∗i = (p
∗
h − k)(1 −
T ) + (p∗f (1 − φs) − k)T − F . One can verify that p∗h > p∗f (1 − φs) for small k. Thus, it
follows that
∂pi∗i
∂c
> max{∂pi∗i
∂φb
,
∂pi∗i
∂φs
} if i) ∂T
∂c
< min{ ∂T
∂φb
, T
∂φs
}, ii) ∂p∗h
∂c
> max{∂p∗h
∂φb
,
∂p∗h
∂φs
}, and iii)
∂p∗f (1−φs)
∂c
> max{∂p
∗
f (1−φs)
∂φb
,
∂p∗f (1−φs)
∂φs
}. Condition i) follows from above. Condition ii) follows
for k sufficiently small with use of (C.1). Condition iii) follows with use of (C.2).
Third, consider buyer surplus and denote C as the equilibrium number of searches, and S
as the equilibrium number of cross-border transactions. The only possible first-order effects
from a marginal change in an explanatory variable, z = {c, φs, φb}, involve the effects on i)
increased prices for given levels of demand, n[
∂p∗h
∂z
(1− T ) + ∂p
∗
f
∂z
T ], ii) increased total resource
costs for existing search activity, C ∂c
∂z
, and iii) increased total resource costs for existing cross-
border transactions, which now equals S
∂(φb+φs)p
∗
f
∂z
. Information frictions, c, then produce the
larger total marginal effect when k is sufficiently small. This follows because i) they produce
larger marginal effects on both p∗h in (C.1) and p
∗
f in (C.2), and ii) because they produce
larger resource effects as the equilibrium number of searches, C, is strictly larger than the
equilibrium number of cross-border transactions, S, with C
S
=
G(xˆ+p∗h−p∗f (1+φb))· 1(1−G(xˆ))
G(xˆ+p∗h−p∗f (1+φb))
> 1.
Finally, using the text, the proof for total welfare follows immediately as we need only
consider the resource effects in ii) above.
Finally, we can verify the two results given within the text at the end of Section 7.1.
Claim 4. Under iceberg trade costs:
i) The marginal effect from an increase in the strength of seller trade costs, φs, is always
larger in reducing cross-border, T , than the marginal effect from an increase in the strength
of buyer trade costs, φb, when k > 0.
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ii) The marginal effect from an increase in localized tastes, γb, on reducing cross-border
trade, T , is larger than the marginal effect from an increase in the strength of buyer or seller
trade costs, φb and φs, when marginal production costs, k, are sufficiently small.
To derive these, one can use (C.3), to note that i) ∂T
∂φs
= − k(1+φb)
2µ(1−φs)2 <
∂T
∂φb
= − k
2µ(1−φs) < 0
given φs, φb, k > 0, and ii)
∂T
∂γb
= − 1
2µ
< ∂T
∂φs
< ∂T
∂φb
when k is sufficiently small.
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